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New York’s Amazon Tax Not Out of the Forest Yet: The 
Battle Over Affiliate Nexus 
Sam Zaprzalka† 
“[I]n this world nothing is certain but death and taxes.” 
Benjamin Franklin1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
We’ve all done it.  After finding an item we want in a store, we 
think, “I can find it online for less.  Plus, I won’t have to pay sales tax!”  
This phenomenon, occurring at an ever-increasing rate, has left many 
state governments feeling that they are missing out on tax revenue from 
those online sales.2  For this reason, it was a virtual certainty that states 
would attempt to impose state sales tax on sales by internet retailers, or 
“e-tailers,” located out-of-state. 
On April 9, 2008, New York attempted to do just that.3  As part of 
its budget for the 2008–2009 fiscal year, the state of New York passed 
§ 1101(b)(8)(vi) of the New York Tax Law (“the Statute”), more com-
monly known as the “Amazon Tax.”4  The Statute seeks to impose a state 
sales tax collection obligation on out-of-state e-tailers by creating a re-
buttable presumption that the vendor has a taxable physical presence in 
New York.5  The most controversial feature of the Statute is that an in-
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 1. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (Nathan Haskell Dole ed., 10th ed., Bartleby.com 
2000) (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to M. Leroy (1789)), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/100/245.24.html. 
 2. See Eric A. Ess, Comment, Internet Taxation Without Physical Representation?: States Seek 
Solution to Stop E-Commerce Sales Tax Shortfall, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 893, 894 (2006). 
 3. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (2008). 
 4. Saul Hansell, Amazon Sues Over State Law on Collection of Sales Tax, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/nyregion/02amazon.html [hereinafter Han-
sell 1]. 
 5. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 526.10 (2009).  The presumption is that once the 
vendor has entered into an agreement with a New York resident and that agreement has generated 
more than $10,000 of New York sales, the vendor is presumed to have solicited sales in the state and 
the Statute applies to that vendor.  Id.  This obligates the vendor to collect and remit New York sales 
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ternet retailer’s agreements with its affiliate marketers6 located in New 
York trigger this rebuttable presumption, creating a taxable “nexus”7 in 
New York.8  Not surprisingly, Amazon.com was unimpressed with the 
idea of the Amazon Tax and filed suit against New York.9  The suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the Statute was filed on April 25, 2008, 
just two weeks after the measure was adopted.10  Overstock.com filed a 
similar suit on May 30, 2008.11,12 
The plaintiffs, Amazon and Overstock, advanced nearly identical 
arguments, noting that U.S. Supreme Court precedent erects significant 
hurdles to imposing state sales tax collection obligations on vendors who 
do not have a physical presence in the state.13  The plaintiffs argued that 
these hurdles should preclude New York’s attempt to impose state tax 
collection obligations on internet vendors. 
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the New York Supreme Court 
(“NY Court”)14 did not agree.  On January 12, 2009, the court ruled in 
                                                                                                             
tax on all of its New York sales.  Id.  The presumption of solicitation is rebutted when the vendor 
positively refutes that its activities in the state constitute solicitation.  Id. 
 6. Affiliate marketing involves a merchant developing advertisements, hyperlinks, and e-mail 
campaigns that the affiliate can post on its website, or send to its customers, to promote the mer-
chant’s products.  Tom Taulli, Creating a Virtual Sales Force, FORBES, Nov. 9, 2005, 
http://www.forbes.com/business/2005/11/08/marketing-ecommerce-internetcx_tt_1109straightup.ht 
ml (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).  The affiliate is compensated by the merchant every time a customer 
“clicks through” the advertisement or link on the affiliate’s website into the merchant’s website and 
then completes the action agreed upon by the merchant and the affiliate (e.g., purchasing a product, 
completing a form).  Id.  The relationship between the affiliate and the merchant is governed by an 
agreement that the affiliate agrees to before it can receive compensation from the vendor.  Id. 
 7. A taxable “nexus” is loosely defined as a physical presence in the state that warrants the 
imposition of a tax collection obligation.  See Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314 (1992); 
see also infra Part V.B.1. 
 8. Hansell 1, supra note 4.  The Statute defines physical presence to include an agreement with 
any website that earns referral fees for sending customers to the online retailer—i.e. affiliate marke-
ters.  See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi). 
 9. Complaint at 1, Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (No. 601247/08) [hereinafter Amazon Complaint]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Complaint at 1, Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2009) (No. 107581/08) [hereinafter Overstock Complaint]. 
 12. The Amazon and Overstock cases have been combined due to the similarity of the argu-
ments they make against the Statute.  See infra note 134. 
 13. The largest hurdle is found in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, wherein the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that if a vendor’s only connection with a state is through the U.S. mail or other common 
carriers, there is not a sufficient nexus for the state to impose sales or use tax collection obligations.  
504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 14. The New York Supreme Court is the trial court for the state of New York, while the state’s 
highest court is called the New York Court of Appeals.  New York State Unified Court System, 
Civil Court Structure, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/structure.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 
2009). 
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favor of New York, granting summary judgment for the state.15  In fact, 
the court was rather emphatic in its decision, stating that “[the plaintiffs] 
ha[ve] not come close to refuting the [Statute’s] presumed constitutional-
ity . . . .”16 
This Comment argues that the NY Court’s dismissal was only par-
tially correct.17  The court was correct in noting that applying the Statute 
to the plaintiffs is consistent with the Due Process Clause under current 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent because the plaintiffs purposefully di-
rected their activities toward New York.18  However, the NY Court erred 
in holding that the Statute meets the dormant Commerce Clause’s “sub-
stantial nexus” requirement by imputing the affiliates’ activities to the 
plaintiffs.  While the activities of an in-state contractor or salesperson are 
sufficient to create a taxable nexus, traditional advertising is considered 
insufficient in this regard.  Because the affiliates’ activities more closely 
resemble traditional advertising than the activities of an in-state contrac-
tor or salesperson, the Statute is in violation of the Commerce Clause.19  
Because of this violation, the Statute is unconstitutional and should be 
overturned.20 
To introduce the issues involved, Part II of this Comment describes 
sales and use taxes, particularly their significance as a state revenue 
source and problems with collecting them.  Additionally, Part II dis-
cusses the motivations behind taxing e-commerce.  Part III explores ap-
plicable case law, including several relevant Supreme Court cases that 
define the parameters of the plaintiffs’ claims and a New York Court of 
                                                 
 15. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 846–47; Overstock, No. 107581/08, slip op.  The Overstock 
decision was minimal and referred the reader to the Amazon decision.  Overstock, No. 107581/08, 
slip op. at 4. 
 16. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 848. 
 17. The evidence used in writing this Comment is found solely in the parties’ briefs, the at-
tached exhibits, the NY Court’s ruling, and any other publicly available information.  At the time 
this Comment was written, no discovery had been conducted. 
 18. See infra Part V.A. 
 19. See infra Part V.B. 
 20. While this Comment argues that the court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ case, it does so 
based solely on the substantive constitutional arguments on the two issues noted.  Amazon also 
raised a third constitutional issue—an Equal Protection Clause claim—that is beyond the scope of 
this Comment.  In addition, the parties have made procedural arguments that may affect the eventual 
outcome of the litigation on appeal, but those arguments are also beyond the scope of this Comment.  
For example, the plaintiffs claim that the Statute is impermissibly vague, the statutory presumption is 
irrational, and the presumption is “effectively irrebuttable.”  See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum of 
Law in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to the Defendant’s Mo-
tion to Dismiss, Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (No. 601247/08) [hereinafter Amazon Memo].  In re-
sponse, New York asserts that the plaintiffs’ “as-applied” claims are unripe, the plaintiffs cannot 
make an “impermissibly vague” argument at this time, and the plaintiffs have not exhausted their 
administrative remedies.  Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Ama-
zon, 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (No. 601247/08) [hereinafter Defendant’s Memo]. 
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Appeals case.  Part IV introduces the statutory language and describes 
how the Statute has been interpreted by the agency charged with enforc-
ing it—the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (DTF).  
Part V examines the NY Court’s Amazon and Overstock decisions on 
both the Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause chal-
lenges.  Finally, Part VI briefly discusses the Statute’s side effects, in-
cluding a reduction in business for the New York affiliates. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF SALES AND USE TAXES 
The central issue presented in the Amazon and Overstock cases is 
the obligation to collect state taxes on sales when most e-tailers are not 
presently obligated to do so.  In order to understand why the collection 
obligation exists, this Part briefly introduces the sales tax and its compa-
nion tax, the use tax.  This Part then examines why New York and other 
states are attempting to impose a sales tax collection obligation on e-
tailers. 
A.  Sales and Use Taxes Defined 
Simply put, a sales tax is a tax on the sale of goods and services.21  
While forty-five states and the District of Columbia employ sales taxes,22 
individual counties or cities within these states may also impose their 
own separate sales taxes.23  As a result, there are presently at least 7,600 
taxing jurisdictions within the U.S.24  Sales taxes, along with use taxes, 
are the largest source of revenue for most states—accounting for nearly 
one third of all state taxes collected in 2008.25 
The most unique feature of the sales tax is the way it is collected 
and remitted to the proper governmental authority.  Instead of being the 
consumer’s responsibility, as is the case with income and use taxes, sales 
                                                 
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1579 (9th ed. 2009).  The first sales tax was implemented in 
Mississippi in 1932 as a way to generate revenue during the Great Depression.  Ess, supra note 2, at 
895. 
 22. Sarah Saidel Barris, Note, New Jersey’s Legislature May Have Trouble Tapping a New 
Source of Revenue, 5 PITT. TAX REV. 61, 64 (2007).  No sales or use tax is imposed in Alaska, De-
laware, Montana, New Hampshire, or Oregon.  Ess, supra note 2, at 895 n.24. 
 23. Ess, supra note 2, at 895.  Each taxing jurisdiction has its own unique tax code and tax rate.  
Ryan J. Swartz, Note, The Imposition of Sales and Use Taxes on E-Commerce: A Taxing Dilemma 
for States and Remote Sellers, 2 J. HIGH TECH. L. 143, 144 (2003). 
 24. Swartz, supra note 23, at 144. 
 25. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENTS DIVISION, 2008 ANNUAL SURVEY OF STATE 
GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS, available at http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/ (click on 
“Summary Table” hyperlink to download summary spreadsheet).  Total general sales and gross 
receipts taxes collected by all states for 2008 were $240,415,097,000, while the total taxes collected 
by all states were $781,325,294,000; thus, sales taxes comprised 30.7% of total taxes collected.  Id. 
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taxes require the vendor to collect and remit the tax.26  Given the large 
number of jurisdictions, this can be an extraordinarily complex task and a 
substantial burden on the vendors.  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
held that states can impose a sales tax collection obligation only on ven-
dors that have a substantial nexus with the state.27  Due to this limitation, 
states began to utilize the use tax in order to tax sales from out-of-state 
vendors.28 
A use tax is a tax on the use of goods that are purchased outside of 
a taxing authority’s jurisdiction.29  Because the use tax applies only to the 
use of products within the state that were purchased out of state, and thus 
not previously subjected to the sales tax, the use tax is complementary to 
the sales tax.30  The main difference between the two taxes is the location 
of the purchaser relative to the vendor; an intrastate transaction triggers a 
sales tax, while an interstate transaction triggers a use tax.31 
Use taxes are generally imposed to discourage interstate transac-
tions for the purpose of avoiding sales tax.32  Thus, the use tax rate is 
typically identical to the sales tax rate.33  A use tax credit must be given 
for sales tax paid in another state so that the same purchase is not taxed 
twice.34  The burden of remitting the use tax lies on the purchaser or user 
of the goods.35 
B.  Why Tax E-Commerce? 
Putting the burden of remitting the use tax on the purchaser creates 
several problems, which result in almost universal noncompliance.  First, 
most consumers do not realize that they need to remit use tax for online 
or other out-of-state purchases.36  It is a common misconception that if a 
vendor does not collect sales tax, there is no tax at all.37  Second, an al-
most complete lack of enforcement of the use tax by states aggravates 
                                                 
 26. Barris, supra note 22, at 62–63. 
 27. Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 28. Barris, supra note 22, at 63. 
 29. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1579 (9th ed. 2009). 
 30. Ess, supra note 2, at 896. 
 31. Id.  Thus, while it is commonly stated that states are attempting to get e-tailers to collect 
sales tax, more accurately, the states want e-tailers to collect use tax. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Barris, supra note 22, at 64. 
 34. Ess, supra note 2, at 896.  This also avoids legal challenges to the use tax under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause, which imparts that states may not hinder interstate commerce by means of 
double taxation.  Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Christina T. Le, Note, The Honeymoon’s Over: States Crack Down on the Virtual World’s 
Tax-Free Love Affair With E-Commerce, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 395, 400 (2007). 
 37. Swartz, supra note 23, at 144. 
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this misconception.38  Without an effective system to monitor residents’ 
purchasing behavior, states have difficulties enforcing payment of the 
use tax.39  In addition, any attempt to monitor such behavior would create 
numerous operational and privacy issues.40  The third and final problem 
is plain, old disobedience.41  Even if a consumer is aware of the use tax 
obligation, knowledge that a violation is unlikely to be punished contri-
butes to non-compliance.42 
This non-compliance has long troubled states due to the accompa-
nying loss of tax revenue.43  The erosion of state tax collections44 has 
been exacerbated by the growing popularity of internet retail sales45 and 
total dollar amount.46  One study reported that the increase in e-
commerce cost states between $15.5 and $16.1 billion in lost tax revenue 
in 2003 alone.47  That amount was predicted to increase to between $21.5 
                                                 
 38. Ess, supra note 2, at 897. 
 39. Id. at 897. 
 40. Id. at 898.  Operational issues include the fact that any system used to conduct audits of use 
tax would not be cost effective due to the high cost of the infrastructure needed (auditors, software, 
etc.) and the minimal dollar amount of any collections.  Swartz, supra note 23, at 144.  The tracking 
of consumers’ purchases required to make such a system effective would also create invasion-of-
privacy concerns.  Ess, supra note 2, at 898. 
 41. Ess, supra note 2, at 898. 
 42. This is likely an understatement: the use tax has been referred to as the “most ignored tax 
on the books.”  Id. at 897 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 107-240, at 37 (2001)). 
 43. Ess, supra note 2, at 898 (noting that because of the internet, consumers can now avoid the 
sales tax on almost any item by purchasing from a remote e-tailer who lacks substantial nexus with 
the taxing state). 
 44. Id. 
 45. In 2008, e-commerce sales accounted for only 3.35% of total U.S. retail sales.  Press Re-
lease, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 1st Quarter 2009 (May 15, 2009), 
available at http://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/09Q1.html.  This percentage 
breaks down as follows: 1st quarter: $33.543 billion (3.3% of total); 2nd quarter: $33.889 billion 
(3.3% of total); 3rd quarter: $33.494 billion (3.4% of total); and 4th quarter: $31.482 billion (3.4% 
of total) (these figures do not include online travel services, financial brokers, and online ticket 
sales).  Id.  However, prior to the recession that started in 2008, e-commerce sales were growing at 
four to five times the rate of overall retail sales.  See id.  While total retail sales grew between 2.4% 
and 4.4% each quarter in 2007 over the same quarter in 2006, corresponding e-commerce sales grew 
between 17.5% and 20.4%.  Id. 
 46. E-commerce sales have been projected to increase to $235.4 billion in 2009 and to further 
increase each year up to $334.7 billion in 2012, adding approximately $33 billion in sales in each 
interim year.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 646 
tbl. 1015 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2009edition.html.  These 
figures exclude online travel sales.  Id. 
 47. DONALD BRUCE & WILLIAM F. FOX, STATE AND LOCAL SALES TAX REVENUE LOSSES 
FROM E-COMMERCE: ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2004 4-5 (2004), available at 
http://cber.bus.utk.edu/ecomm/ecom0704.pdf.  The estimates were made using a weighted average 
sales tax rate of 6.5%.  Id. at 4. 
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and $33.7 billion in 2008.48  The states with the largest populations, such 
as New York, will see the largest losses.49 
Given the important role that sales taxes play in states’ revenue 
production, states are attempting to fill gaps in the revenue losses result-
ing from e-commerce.  The increasing popularity of internet shopping 
has begun to erode states’ sales tax collections without a corresponding 
increase in use tax collections because most e-tailers are located out-of-
state and therefore are not obligated to collect and remit state use tax.  As 
a result of this erosion, many states are looking for ways to generate ad-
ditional revenue,50 including ways to impose tax collection obligations 
on out-of-state e-tailers.  In their search for a solution, states must be 
aware of certain constitutional issues that may arise. 
III.  THE EVOLUTION OF SALES AND USE TAX JURISPRUDENCE 
Remote retailers typically use two separate constitutional chal-
lenges to fight the imposition of a use tax collection obligation on inter-
state commerce.51  First, the Due Process Clause, as laid out in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, prevents states from depriving citizens of 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”52  The U.S. Su-
preme Court has interpreted this to mean that taxpayers cannot be unfair-
ly deprived of tax dollars through taxation by jurisdictions with which 
the seller does not have sufficient minimum contacts.53  Second, the 
Commerce Clause gives Congress the right to regulate all interstate 
commerce,54 including e-commerce.55  The Court held that the Com-
                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 6. 
 50. See, e.g., Steve Lawrence, Schwarzenegger Wants to Tax Golf, Auto Repairs, VENTURA 
COUNTY STAR, Jan. 26, 2009, available at http://www.venturacountystar.com/news/2009/jan/26/bc-
ca—state-budget-service-taxes1208-wants-to/ (describing a potential tax on golf greens fees, auto 
repair, veterinary services, amusement parks, and appliance and furniture repairs). 
 51. These challenges have arisen in cases dealing with mail-order catalogs, a predecessor of e-
commerce that involves many of the same issues.  A mail-order business is similar to e-commerce in 
that the retailer is located out-of-state and sends the item to the customer through the mail or by 
common carrier.  Ess, supra note 2, at 894.  Like e-commerce, the physical package is generally the 
retailer’s only connection with the taxing jurisdiction.  See id. 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. 
 53. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir. Div. of Tax’n, 504 U.S. 768, 777 (1992) (citing Miller Bros. Co. 
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)).  The jurisdiction must have sufficient minimum contact 
with the activity, not just the actor, intended to be taxed.  Id. at 778. 
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 55. STEVEN MAGUIRE, STATE AND LOCAL SALES AND USE TAXES AND INTERNET COMMERCE, 
CRS Report for Congress 1 (2005) available at http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/RL312 
52_050128.pdf. 
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merce Clause requires a retailer to have a substantial nexus with the tax-
ing state before it can be obligated to collect and remit tax.56 
To understand how these constitutional issues apply to the Statute, 
this Part examines the case law that has shaped the current sales tax land-
scape.  This Part begins with applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedent, 
breaking the Court’s decisions down into three groups—the first two 
based on whether the case affects the Due Process Clause or the Com-
merce Clause analysis and the third consisting of cases that affect attribu-
tional nexus.  While each of the following cases is discussed in one or 
more of the groups, a chronology of the cases may be helpful: Scripto, 
Inc. v. Carson (1960), National Bella Hess v. Department of Revenue of 
Illinois (1967), Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady (1977), National 
Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization (1977), Tyler 
Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington Department of Revenue (1987), and 
ending with the Court’s most recent ruling on the subject, Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota (1992).  This Part also examines one relevant New York 
Court of Appeals ruling that interpreted Quill—Orvis Company, Inc. v. 
Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York (1995).57 
A.  Due Process Clause Cases 
With regard to the nexus issue, the U.S. Supreme Court’s history 
with the Due Process Clause is complicated.  The Court has steadily lo-
wered the Due Process Clause standard from requiring some minimal 
physical connection to the taxing jurisdiction to simply requiring that one 
purposefully direct his or her activities toward the jurisdiction. 
One of the first cases addressing the nexus issue was Scripto, Inc. v. 
Carson.  In Scripto, the Court held that the activities of independent con-
tractors are sufficient to create the necessary “minimum connections” for 
the state to impose tax under the Due Process Clause.58  The Court found 
the fact that Scripto’s “salesm[e]n”59 were independent contractors, as 
opposed to regular, full-time employees of Scripto, to be without consti-
                                                 
 56. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
 57. 630 N.Y.S.2d 680.  The Orvis case is important because of the reliance placed on it by New 
York, in its briefs, and by Justice Bransten in her decision in the Amazon case.  See Amazon.com, 
LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 58. 362 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1960).  Scripto was a Georgia corporation that lacked any physical 
presence in Florida.  Id. at 208–09. 
 59. Scripto had hired independent contractors—“wholesalers” or “salesm[e]n”—who were 
Florida residents with designated territories within Florida, to solicit its sales.  Id. at 209.  The inde-
pendent contractors were engaged to actively solicit sales and were paid a commission, even on 
repeat sales.  Id.  Orders were sent to the Atlanta office for approval because the contractors had no 
authority to collect on sales or incur debts.  Id. 
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tutional significance.60  Consequently, Scripto could be required to col-
lect and remit sales and use taxes to Florida.61 
Just seven years later, in National Bella Hess v. Department of Rev-
enue of Illinois, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not sup-
port a tax collection obligation for a remote seller whose only contact 
with the state was through the U.S. mail.62  National Bella Hess’s only 
contact with Illinois was mailing catalogs twice a year.63  When Illinois 
attempted to collect tax on Bella Hess’s sales in the state, Bella Hess pro-
tested, arguing that the Statute was unconstitutional under the Due 
Process and Commerce Clauses.64  In order for the taxation to be fair un-
der either clause,65 the Court held that there must be some definite link or 
a minimum physical connection between the state and the entity it at-
tempts to tax.66  The Court acknowledged that it had never found such a 
link where the vendor’s only connection with the state was through the 
U.S. mail.67 
The Court clarified the required relationship between the seller’s 
physical connection with the state and the activities giving rise to the use 
tax collection obligation in National Geographic Society v. California 
Board of Equalization.68  The Court held that it did not matter whether 
the activities occurring within the state were connected to the activities 
giving rise to the use tax collection obligation.69  As long as there was a 
                                                 
 60. Id. at 211–12 (stating that the only non-local part of the transaction was the acceptance of 
the order and that formally tagging the salesperson as “independent” would not change the “local 
function of solicitation” or “its effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida”).  
This statement reflects what is called “attributional nexus,” a technique by which a state “attributes” 
physical presence to an out-of-state retailer in order to subject the remote retailer to taxation.  And-
rew W. Swain & Nathaniel T. Trelease, Taxing Time for the Internet?, 15 BUS. L. TODAY 11, 13, 15 
(2005). 
 61. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 211–12. 
 62. Nat’l Bella Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). 
 63. Id. at 754.  Bella Hess did not own any property in the state and did not send any sales-
people into the state.  Id.  With the exception of the catalogs, it also did not do any advertising in the 
state.  Id. 
 64. Id. at 755–56.  The Illinois statute defined Bella Hess as a “retailer maintaining a place of 
business in this State” because that term included any retailer “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within 
this State from users by means of catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are received 
or accepted within or without this State.”  Id. at 755 (quoting 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/2 
(1965)).  Thus, under the statute, Bella Hess was required to collect and remit use tax to Illinois.  35 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/2. 
 65. The Court noted that the Due Process and Commerce Clause claims were so “closely re-
lated” that it considered them together.  Nat’l Bella Hess, 386 U.S. at 756. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 757. 
 68. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).  The National Geographic Society had two offices in California that 
solicited advertising for the magazine.  Id. at 554 n.2.  The offices did not “perform [any] activities 
related to the Society’s operation of a mail-order business.”  Id. at 552. 
 69. Id. at 561. 
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“definite link, some minimum connection” between the seller and the 
state, the seller could be obligated to collect use tax.70  In the Court’s 
view, the Society’s two offices in California clearly created this link.71  
The Court also noted that having only the “slightest presence” in a state 
would not be sufficient to establish nexus.72 
The Court revisited the Bella Hess physical presence standard in 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota.73  The case arose from North Dakota’s at-
tempt to require Quill Corporation to collect and remit use taxes on its 
sales in the state, despite Quill’s “insignificant or nonexistent” physical 
presence in the state.74  While the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld 
the tax,75 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.76  In its decision, the Court 
examined the Due Process and Commerce Clause claims separately, con-
trary to its ruling in Bella Hess.77 
The U.S. Supreme Court moved away from its physical presence 
requisite under the Due Process Clause, instead deciding that Due 
Process was more concerned with “fundamental fairness.”78  Examining 
a line of in personam jurisdiction cases, the Court noted that as long as a 
business’s activities are “purposefully directed” toward a state, a lack of 
physical presence had never been sufficient to defeat jurisdiction in the 
state.79  The Court held that the Due Process Clause did not bar enforce-
ment of the state tax obligation against Quill because a business that soli-
                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 556. 
 73. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 74. The company’s only contact with North Dakota was sending catalogs and fulfilled orders 
into the state by U.S. mail or by common carrier.  Id. at 302.  North Dakota required Quill to collect 
use taxes under a state law that defined “retailer” to include “every person who engages in regular or 
systematic solicitation . . . in th[e] state.”  Id. at 302–03.  “Regular or systematic” was defined to 
mean three or more advertisements within a twelve-month period.  Id. at 303. 
 75. Id. at 303–04.  The North Dakota Supreme Court cited changes in the economy and laws as 
reasons for why following Bella Hess was inappropriate, specifically noting that catalog sales had 
changed from an “inconsequential market niche” to a “goliath” and that computers eased the burden 
of compliance with multiple taxing jurisdictions.  Id. at 303.  The Court also noted that cases after 
Bella Hess had not required a physical presence under the “minimum contacts” test and said that the 
relevant inquiry was whether “the state has provided some protection, opportunities, or benefit for 
which it can expect a return.”  Id. at 304.  In the Court’s view, the fact that North Dakota had created 
“an economic climate that foster[ed] demand for” Quill’s products was sufficient to generate “a 
constitutionally sufficient nexus” to justify the tax.  Id. 
 76. Id. at 319. 
 77. Id. at 305.  The Court cited the evolution of its due process jurisprudence since Bella Hess 
and noted that “although we have not always been precise in distinguishing between the two, the 
Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause are analytically distinct.”  Id. at 305–07.  The Court 
also noted that “[t]he two standards are animated by different constitutional concerns and policies.”  
Id. at 312. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 307–08 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). 
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cits sales in a state through catalogs “clearly has ‘fair warning that [its] 
activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.’”80  
However, the Court had a different take on Quill’s obligation under the 
Commerce Clause. 
B. Commerce Clause Cases 
The Commerce Clause, unlike the Due Process Clause, is not con-
cerned with fairness, but rather prohibiting discrimination against inter-
state commerce.81  To this end, the Court has consistently required at 
least a minimal physical connection with the jurisdiction before a tax 
collection obligation could be imposed. 
While the Court had previously contemplated the Commerce 
Clause in Bella Hess, it first examined the requirements a tax must meet 
to survive a Commerce Clause challenge in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v. Brady.82  Under the new four-part test the Court adopted, a tax is valid 
when the “tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with 
the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the state.”83 
In Quill, the Court attempted to more clearly define the substantial 
nexus requirement of Complete Auto Transit, but did not specify what 
level of physical presence would fulfill it.84  According to the Court, it is 
possible for a business to have “minimum contacts” with a state suffi-
cient to satisfy the Due Process Clause but still lack a substantial nexus 
with the state as required by the Commerce Clause.85  The Court also 
noted that a “safe harbor” had been created for vendors “whose only 
connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common carrier or 
                                                 
 80. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977)) (alterations in 
original). 
 81. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.  More precisely, it is the negative sweep of the dormant Commerce 
Clause that prevents states from unduly burdening interstate commerce.  Ess, supra note 2, at 901.  
The Bella Hess bright-line physical presence requirement is a means to “further[] the ends of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.”  Id. at 314.  In footnote six of the Quill decision, the Court notes that 
North Dakota’s tax is a good illustration of how a state might unduly burden interstate commerce.  
Id. at 313 n.6. 
 82. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).  Complete Auto Transit was a Michigan corporation that transported 
cars by motor carrier for General Motors.  Id. at 276.  The state of Mississippi collected taxes based 
on sales completed when the company delivered cars to dealers located in Mississippi.  Id.  Com-
plete Auto Transit requested a refund, calling the taxes unconstitutional because the “transportation 
was but one part of an interstate movement.”  Id. at 277. 
 83. Id. at 279.  The Court ultimately held for Mississippi, stating that the plaintiff had not 
claimed that the tax violated any of these four criteria.  Id. at 287–89. 
 84. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313.  The Court stated that the “slightest” physical presence is not suffi-
cient to establish substantial nexus under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 315 n.8. 
 85. Id. at 313. 
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the United States mail.”86  Thus, such vendors are free from any state-
imposed obligations to collect sales and use taxes.87  Because Quill’s on-
ly connection to North Dakota was by common carrier and U.S. mail, the 
Court determined that substantial nexus was not satisfied.88 
The Quill decision has created problems for courts throughout the 
country as they wrestle with what constitutes a substantial nexus.89  The 
Quill decision regarding catalog sales companies applies to all remote 
retailers, including e-tailers.90  Because most e-tailers lack a physical 
presence in all but a few states, they often fall under the safe harbor 
created in Quill and can therefore avoid the burdens of collecting sales 
and use taxes.91  However, not all remote retailers are so lucky. 
In Orvis Company, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New 
York, the New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, held that 
the Quill substantial nexus standard did not require a substantial physical 
presence in the state.92  In refusing to extend the physical presence stan-
dard to include the “slightest presence,” the Orvis court cited Quill’s two 
justifications for keeping the standard.93  First, the court noted that the 
physical presence standard furthered the ends of the Commerce Clause 
by creating a bright-line test that clearly demarcates the vendors who 
qualify for safe harbor.94  The creation of a “substantial” physical pres-
ence standard would destroy this bright-line rule by requiring a “case-by-
case evaluation of the actual burdens imposed.”95  Second, the court 
noted that the physical presence test has “engendered substantial reliance 
and has become part of a basic framework of a sizeable industry.”96  
Based on these justifications, the court concluded that Quill could not 
                                                 
 86. Id. at 315 (quoting Nat’l Bella Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 
(1967)) (alteration in original). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Le, supra note 36, at 405. 
 90. Id. at 407. 
 91. Ess, supra note 2, at 902. 
 92. 86 N.Y.2d 165, 177–78 (1995).  Orvis Company was a Vermont company whose only 
contact with New York, other than through common carrier, was its salespeople making approx-
imately twelve visits to wholesale customers located in the state during the three-year period in 
question.  Id. at 187–88.  In deciding that the company had a substantial nexus in the state, the ma-
jority noted that this activity accounted for approximately 15% of Orvis’ New York sales and that 
the salespeople traveled “in a loop,” which suggested “systematic visitation” to the customers.  Id. at 
179–80.  The dissent, however, argued that Supreme Court precedent actually required “continuous” 
solicitation in the state to meet the substantial nexus standard.  Id. at 182 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).  
Under this standard, the occasional trips by Orvis’ salespeople into New York were not sufficient to 
create substantial nexus.  Id. at 187. 
 93. Id. at 175–76 (majority opinion). 
 94. Id. at 176. 
 95. Id. at 177 (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992)). 
 96. Orvis, 86 N.Y.2d at 176 (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 315). 
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have mandated a substantial physical presence standard.97  Because Bella 
Hess, which the Court relied upon in Quill, required only a “definite link 
or minimum connection,” the Orvis court reasoned that the presence only 
needed to be “demonstrably more than a ‘slightest presence.’”98  The 
court ruled that this standard was met when Orvis’s employees made sys-
tematic sales calls in the state.99 
While the standard articulated in Orvis begins to answer the ques-
tion of how much of a physical presence is required for substantial nex-
us, the physical presence standard is still difficult to apply in any given 
situation.  For example, the standard does not give a definitive answer to 
the plaintiffs’ challenge of the Statute.  This is especially true when it is 
not the activities of employees at issue, but rather the activities of some 
independent person or entity that must be attributed to the foreign entity. 
C.  Attributional Nexus Cases 
Although never directly addressing attributional nexus, the Court 
has made several indirect declarations in its rulings on Due Process and 
Commerce Clause claims.  The first declaration appeared in Scripto, in 
which the Court attributed the activities of Scripto’s independent con-
tractor salesmen to the company in holding that Scripto had a taxable 
nexus with Florida.100 
The Court further clarified the role a company’s salespeople can 
play in fulfilling the substantial nexus requirement of the Commerce 
Clause in Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of 
Revenue.101  The Court held that whether or not a salesperson was classi-
fied as an independent contractor was not determinative for nexus pur-
poses.102  Instead, the Court found that “the crucial factor governing nex-
us is whether the activities performed in th[e] state on behalf of the tax-
payer are significantly associated with the taxpayer’s ability to establish 
and maintain a market in th[e] state for the sales.”103  In other words, if 
an independent contractor’s activities in the state are significant to the 
                                                 
 97. Id. at 176. 
 98. Id. at 178. 
 99. Id. at 178–79. 
 100. See supra note 59. 
 101. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).  Tyler Pipe Industries sold pipes in Washington that it manufactured 
out of state.  Id. at 249.  The company argued that its lone connection with Washington—an inde-
pendent contractor located in Seattle who acted as the company’s in-state salesperson—did not 
create a sufficient nexus with the state to justify collection of a gross receipts tax on its sales.  Id. at 
249–50. 
 102. Id. at 250. 
 103. Id.  The Court held that Tyler Pipe’s representative satisfied this standard because the 
“sales representatives perform any local activities necessary for maintenance of Tyler Pipe’s market 
and protection of its interest . . . .”  Id. at 251. 
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foreign seller’s ability to sell items in the state, the seller has a taxable 
nexus in the state. 
This is the Court’s most current standard for determining whether 
the activities of an independent entity should be attributed to a foreign e-
tailer.  However, in a case brought by Amazon and Overstock, the first 
place to look is at the statutory language and at how the DTF interprets 
that language. 
IV.  THE NEW YORK STATUTE AND DTF’S INTERPRETATION 
The source of controversy in this case is New York Tax Law § 
1101(b)(8)(vi).104  Even before its enactment on April 23, 2008, the Sta-
tute had already engendered significant controversy.105  To explain why, 
this Part first introduces the statutory language and examine what makes 
it controversial.  This Part then analyzes both of the technical service 
bureau memorandums (TSB-M) that the DTF has issued to explain its 
interpretation of the Statute.106  The TSB-Ms attempt to head off some of 
the controversy by explaining how the DTF intends to enforce the Sta-
tute.107 
A.  The Statute 
What makes the Statute unique and controversial is its novel defini-
tion of what constitutes a physical presence in New York.108  Under the 
Statute, if any of a merchant’s affiliates are located in New York,109 the 
merchant is presumed to be soliciting sales in the state and therefore has 
                                                 
 104. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (2008). 
 105. In fact, the Statute was so controversial that the New York Senate seems to have changed 
its mind on the issue; it voted to repeal the Statute on June 24, 2008.  See Saul Hansell, New York 
Senate Teases Amazon Customers with Sales Tax Repeal, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, available at 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/new-york-senate-teases-amazon-customers-with-sales-tax-
repeal-bill/ (last visited October 11, 2009).  However, the reversal bill has never made it past the 
committee in the New York Assembly, and it appears unlikely to do so.  See id. 
 106. DTF is the agency charged with enforcing the New York tax laws.  N.Y. TAX LAW § 171 
(2008).  Thus, its interpretation of the statutory language determines the extent to which the Statute 
will affect remote retailers. 
 107. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN., NEW PRESUMPTION APPLICABLE TO DEFINITION 
OF SALES TAX VENDOR, TSB-M-08(3)S (2008) [hereinafter May TSB-M]; see also N.Y. STATE 
DEP’T OF TAX’N & FIN., ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON HOW SELLERS MAY REBUT THE NEW 
PRESUMPTION APPLICABLE TO THE DEFINITION OF SALES TAX VENDOR AS DESCRIBED IN TSB-M-
08(3)S, TSB-M-08(3.1)S (2008) [hereinafter June TSB-M]. 
 108. Hansell 1, supra note 4. 
 109. For the Statute to apply, the merchant must have signed an agreement with the affiliate(s) 
located in New York that pays the affiliate(s) “a commission or other consideration” for “directly or 
indirectly” referring customers to the merchant.  N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi).  Most affiliate 
marketing agreements will meet this requirement.  See Taulli, supra note 6. 
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a substantial nexus with the state.110  Thus, if just one of a merchant’s 
affiliates is located in New York, the company would theoretically be 
obligated to collect and remit New York use tax on all of its sales in the 
state, whether or not it was made through the affiliate.111 
The presumption that the retailer is soliciting sales is triggered only 
if the applicable criterion is met.  However, the presumption can be re-
butted.  To trigger the presumption, a merchant must have more than 
$10,000 in total gross receipts for the year ending on the last day of No-
vember.112  These sales must have been to customers located in New 
York who are referred to the merchant by affiliates who are residents of 
New York.113  If the merchant meets these criteria, the presumption that 
it is soliciting sales in the state can be rebutted by showing proof that its 
affiliates did not engage in any solicitation that would create a substantial 
nexus.114  Unfortunately, the statutory language itself does not elaborate 
on what sort of proof would suffice to show the absence of solicitation.  
Thus, DTF provided additional guidance regarding the Statute’s applica-
tion in the form of two TSB-Ms. 
B.  The Technical Service Bureau Memorandums 
The DTF issued two TSB-Ms115 to provide clarification of the statu-
tory language and to provide information about how it would enforce the 
Statute.116  The two TSB-Ms seem to constrict the Statute’s scope by 
adopting a narrower interpretation of the Statute.117  This is mainly ac-
                                                 
 110. Hansell 1, supra note 4. 
 111. Id. 
 112. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi): 
[A] person making sales of tangible personal property . . . shall be presumed to be solicit-
ing business . . . if the cumulative gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in 
the state who are referred to the seller by all residents with this type of an agreement with 
the seller is in excess of ten thousand dollars during the preceding four quarterly periods 
ending on the last day of February, May, August, and November. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (“This presumption may be rebutted by proof that the resident with whom the seller 
has an agreement did not engage in any solicitation in the state on behalf of the seller that would 
satisfy the nexus requirement of the United States Constitution during the four quarterly periods in 
question.”) 
 115. “A TSB-M is an informational statement of changes to the law, regulations, or Depart-
ment policies.”  New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Memoranda (TSB-Ms), 
http://www.tax.state.ny.us/pubs_and_bulls/memos/memos_tax_types.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
 116. The DTF issued the first of its two TSB-Ms regarding the Statute on May 8, 2008, just 
weeks after the Statute was enacted.  See May TSB-M, supra note 107.  The second TSB-M was 
issued on June 30, 2008, and attempted to clarify the first TSB-M and to further clarify the Statute.  
See June TSB-M, supra note 107. 
 117. George S. Isaacson, Legal Matters: Behind the New York Nexus Saga, ALL ABOUT ROI, 
Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.allaboutroimag.com/article/behind-new-york-nexus-saga-114968_1.html 
(last visited October 11, 2009) (suggesting that this “relatively modest approach to enforcement” 
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complished by limiting the types of compensation schemes the Statute 
applies to and by suggesting ways that the statutory presumption can be 
rebutted.118 
1.  The May TSB-M 
The DTF issued the May TSB-M for two main reasons.  First, it 
clarified that the Statute does not apply to mere advertising or pay-per-
click compensation schemes.119  The TSB-M states that “an agreement to 
place an advertisement [on a website] does not give rise to the presump-
tion” that the remote vendor is soliciting sales, even if the advertisement 
is stored on a server located in New York.120  It also states, however, that 
this is not the case for an advertisement “where the consideration for 
placing the link on the Web site is based on the volume of completed 
sales generated by the link.”121  Thus, advertisements compensated on a 
pay-per-click basis do not bring about the statutory presumption, while 
any advertisements compensated through performance-based commis-
sions do.122 
Second, the May TSB-M provides information as to how a remote 
retailer might rebut the statutory presumption that it is soliciting sales.123  
The presumption can be rebutted as long as the seller can establish that 
the New York resident affiliate’s only activity was the link on the web-
site.124  Unless the seller can establish that each individual New York 
affiliate refrained from using “flyers, newsletters, telephone calls, or e-
mails,” the presumption cannot be rebutted and the seller is obligated to 
collect and remit the tax.125 
                                                                                                             
may have been part of DTF’s attempt to defend the constitutionality of the Statute given the plain-
tiffs’ challenge).  The plaintiffs have suggested that the TSB-Ms were issued as part of the State’s 
litigation strategy.  See Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 8. 
 118. Isaacson, supra note 117. 
 119. May TSB-M, supra note 107, at 1–4. 
 120. Id. at 2. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Isaacson, supra note 117.  “Pay-per-click” means that the website will be compensated a 
set amount every time the link is clicked on, whether or not a sale is made.  PCMag.com, Definition 
of: Pay-Per-Click, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=pay-per-click&i=4890 
8,00.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).  The presumption will apply even if the vendor originally con-
tracted with an out-of-state company, who then made an agreement with a New York resident on 
behalf of the vendor.  May TSB-M, supra note 107, at 3–4.  This situation is shown in Example 
Three of the May TSB-M.  Id. 
 123. May TSB-M, supra note 107, at 4–5. 
 124. Id. at 4. 
 125. Id. at 5. 
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2.  The June TSB-M 
The June TSB-M further clarified the showing required to rebut the 
presumption that the Statute applies.  It provides two conditions that, if 
met, will effectively rebut the presumption.126  First, contractual language 
prohibiting the New York affiliate from soliciting sales through tech-
niques including flyers, newsletters, telephone calls, or e-mails should be 
included in the agreement between the affiliate and the remote retailer.127  
Second, the seller needs to collect a signed certification from each New 
York-based affiliate annually, stating that the affiliate has not engaged in 
any prohibited solicitation activities during the year.128  If the seller does 
not receive a certification from all of its New York affiliates, the DTF 
will determine whether the presumption is rebutted by weighing the sel-
ler’s reliance on the certifications in light of the constitutional nexus 
standard set forth in Quill.129  If the seller satisfies both conditions, it has 
fulfilled the safe harbor requirements, and it will not be required to col-
lect or remit sales or use taxes to New York.130 
While the statutory language and the two TSB-Ms seem to suggest 
varying conclusions regarding the Statute’s reach, the courts will make 
the ultimate decision regarding its interpretation.131  The statutory lan-
guage itself is very broad, encompassing all agreements with New York 
residents that pay a commission or other consideration for directly or 
indirectly referring customers to the seller.132  The TSB-Ms narrow the 
Statute’s scope by exempting advertising and pay-per-click compensa-
tion schemes from its reach.133  However, because Amazon and Over-
stock have challenged the Statute, the final ruling on its reach, and thus 
its constitutionality, will come from the courts. 
                                                 
 126. June TSB-M, supra note 107, at 1. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1–2.  This certification can be in paper or electronic form.  Id.  In addition, the certi-
fication must include a statement advising the representative that any information sent with the certi-
fication could be verified or audited by the DTF.  Id. 
 129. Id. at 2. 
 130. Id. 
 131. It is worth noting that in its ruling, the NY Court did not cite to, or even mention, either of 
the TSB-Ms, despite the reliance the State placed on them in its briefs.  See Amazon.com, LLC v. 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 132. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (2008). 
 133. May TSB-M, supra note 107, at 1–4.  The TSB-Ms do not carry much legal weight and 
thus, are mainly good for two purposes: (1) to show how the DTF intends to enforce the Statute and 
(2) to show that the DTF is trying to narrow the Statute’s scope in an effort to maintain its constitu-
tionality. 
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V.  ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK SUPREME COURT’S RULING 
On January 12, 2009, the NY Court issued a ruling on New York’s 
motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judg-
ment.134  Surprisingly, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Statute 
and granted the State’s motion for summary judgment (dismissing the 
plaintiffs’ claims).135  This Part analyzes the NY Court’s analysis of each 
of the plaintiffs’ claims, critiques the court’s decision, and offers an al-
ternative rationale where appropriate.  This Part begins with the Due 
Process Clause issue and then moves on to the Commerce Clause is-
sue.136 
A.  Due Process Clause Claims 
A tax collection obligation imposed on an out-of-state retailer is 
permissible if it meets the Due Process Clause requirements.137  The NY 
Court determined that the Statute met the requirements.138  This subpart 
first briefly discusses what rationale the NY Court used in making this 
determination.  It then examines whether Amazon and Overstock even 
satisfy the minimum contact requirements of the Due Process Clause—
an issue the NY Court overlooked. 
1.  The NY Court’s Rationale 
The NY Court wasted no time in dismissing the plaintiffs’ Due 
Process Clause claims.139  The court focused on two parts of the plain-
tiffs’ challenge: the claim that the Statute’s rebuttable presumption vi-
olated due process, and the claim that the Statute was void because it was 
                                                 
 134. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 846–47.  The court considered the plaintiffs’ claims collective-
ly, only issuing a brief opinion in the Overstock case that simply referred the reader to the Amazon 
ruling.  Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., No. 107581/08, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2009).  For this reason, this Comment will also treat Amazon and Overstock as one plain-
tiff.  Any exceptions to this general rule will be noted. 
 135. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 846–47.  Both plaintiffs have since appealed the NY Court’s 
rulings.  Overstock filed its notice of appeal on February 10, 2009.  See Notice of Appeal, Overstock, 
No. 107581/08.  Amazon filed its notice on February 18, 2009.  See Notice of Appeal, Amazon, 877 
N.Y.S.2d 842 (No. 601247/08). 
 136. The plaintiffs have stated very similar cases against the Statute.  Compare Amazon Com-
plaint, supra note 9, with Overstock Complaint, supra note 11.  The two are also very similarly 
situated in that both have no physical presence in New York—no property, no offices, no em-
ployees—and both employ affiliate marketers as part of their marketing strategy.  Amazon Com-
plaint, supra note 9, at 6–7; Overstock Complaint, supra note 11, at 5–6.  These factors undoubtedly 
contributed to the NY Court’s decision to treat the two plaintiffs as one in its ruling. 
 137. St. Tammany Parish Tax Collector v. Barnesandnoble.com, 481 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 n.1 
(E.D. La. 2007). 
 138. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 850. 
 139. See id. at 850–51. 
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unconstitutionally vague.140  Ultimately, the NY Court rejected both 
claims.141  However, the court did not address the larger due process is-
sue of whether the plaintiffs had sufficient minimum contacts with New 
York to allow the imposition of the Statute’s tax collection obligation in 
the first place.142 
2.  The Bigger Issue 
The U.S. Supreme Court has established two related tests for use in 
examining whether the due process requirements are met.143  The first 
test involves a determination of whether the out-of-state retailer had suf-
ficient minimum contacts with the state to justify imposing a tax collec-
tion obligation.144  Alternatively, the second test calls for a determination 
of whether the retailer’s activities met the lower threshold of being “pur-
posefully directed” toward the taxing state.145  For example, the Quill 
court held that sending catalogs to North Dakota residents to solicit sales 
satisfied the second test, despite Quill’s complete lack of physical pres-
ence in the state.146 
Like Quill, the plaintiffs do not have sufficient minimum contacts 
with New York to support a tax collection obligation under the Due 
Process Clause.147  It is essentially undisputed that the only physical con-
nection the plaintiffs have with New York is that created by their agree-
ments with their affiliate marketers who reside in the state.148  Assuming 
that the affiliates’ physical presence in New York will not be imputed to 
the plaintiffs,149 the plaintiffs would have no physical presence in the 
state other than by common carrier.150  Thus, the plaintiffs’ minimum 
contacts with New York would be insufficient to support the imposition 
of a tax obligation.151  However, the plaintiffs purposefully directed their 
                                                 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  While the court’s reasoning for one or both of these issues may or may not have been 
sound, both of the issues are procedural and thus beyond the scope of this Comment.  See supra note 
20. 
 142. See Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d. 842. 
 143. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1992). 
 144. St. Tammany Parish Tax Collector v. Barnesandnoble.com, 481 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 n.1 
(E.D. La. 2007).  This is the same test used to determine whether a state has in personam jurisdiction 
over a company.  See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. 
 145. St. Tammany Parish, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (quoting Quill, 504 U.S. at 305–08). 
 146. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 1. 
 149. This Comment argues that the affiliates’ physical presence and activities should not be 
imputed to the plaintiffs.  See discussion infra Part V.B.3. 
 150. Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 1. 
 151. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307.  If the affiliates’ presence is imputed to the plaintiffs, they 
would have sufficient minimum contacts with New York for the imposition of a state tax obligation 
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activities toward the state.  If sending catalogs to North Dakota was suf-
ficient to show that Quill’s activities were purposefully directed towards 
the state, then the plaintiffs signing contracts with their New York affili-
ates would also be sufficient.152  Thus, the plaintiffs would have fair 
warning that they may be subject to a New York tax collection obliga-
tion, as required by the Due Process Clause.153 
Additionally, e-tailers are subject to jurisdiction154 and thus could 
be subject to tax collection obligations imposed by any state in which 
their customers reside.  Most courts follow the sliding scale set forth in 
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. for determining wheth-
er a state has jurisdiction over an e-tailer.155  According to the sliding 
scale, whether jurisdiction can be exercised is “directly proportionate to 
the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over 
the Internet.”156  Personal jurisdiction is proper “[i]f the [business] enters 
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction.”157  Amazon and 
Overstock—both ranked within the top 30 internet retailers158—conduct 
business and enter into contracts over the internet with New York resi-
dents.  Thus, the plaintiffs can be subjected to jurisdiction in New 
York.159  Because the Due Process Clause analysis generally mirrors ju-
risdiction analysis,160 the plaintiffs can also be obligated to collect and 
remit New York taxes under the Due Process Clause.161  However, for 
the imposition of a tax to withstand a constitutional challenge, the more 
substantial burdens imposed by the Commerce Clause must also be satis-
fied. 
                                                                                                             
to be proper under the Due Process Clause.  See id.; Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211–12 
(1960). 
 152. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. 
 153. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985) (noting that “with 
respect to interstate contractual obligations, we have emphasized that parties who ‘reach out beyond 
one state and create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of another state’ are sub-
ject to regulation and sanctions in the other State for the consequences of their activities”). 
 154. Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 155. Id. (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 
1997)). 
 156. Lakin, 348 F.3d at 710 (quoting Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Internetretailer.com, Overstock Files Legal Challenge to New York’s Internet Sales Tax 
(June 6, 2008), http://www.internetretailer.com/dailyNews.asp?id=26708.  In 2007, Overstock was 
ranked number thirty while Amazon was far and away number one, nearly tripling the sales of the 
next closest competitor.  Id. 
 159. See Lakin, 348 F.3d at 710. 
 160. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992). 
 161. See Lakin, 348 F.3d at 710. 
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B.  Commerce Clause Claims 
To be permissible under the Commerce Clause, a state must show 
that imposing a tax meets all four parts of the test outlined in Complete 
Auto Transit.162  The first of the four parts—whether a retailer has a sub-
stantial nexus with the state—generally allows e-tailers to avoid tax col-
lection obligations.163  However, the NY Court felt this case was differ-
ent because the Statute “requires a substantial nexus between an out-of-
state seller and New York through a contract to pay commissions for re-
ferrals with a New York resident.”164  This subpart first examines the 
meaning of substantial nexus, looking at the level of physical presence in 
the state required to satisfy the test.  This subpart then considers and cri-
tiques the court’s ruling on the plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause challenges, 
looking first at the plaintiffs’ “facial” challenge of the Statute and then at 
the “as-applied” challenge. 
1.  Substantial Nexus 
To establish substantial nexus, a “physical presence of the vendor is 
required.”165  While the Quill court set out this standard, it did not elabo-
rate on what level of physical presence would be sufficient to meet it.166  
However, in Orvis, the New York Court of Appeals determined that the 
physical presence required is not a substantial presence, but rather “de-
monstrably more than a ‘slightest presence.’”167 
The Orvis court also adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s determina-
tion of what creates the slightest presence.168  Under this standard, a ven-
dor’s physical presence can be actual or imputed through in-state solici-
tation of sales on the vendor’s behalf—by its employee, agent, or inde-
pendent contractor.169  Advertising on its own, however, is not sufficient 
                                                 
 162. St. Tammany Parish Tax Collector v. Barnesandnoble.com, 481 F. Supp. 2d 575, 577 
(E.D. La. 2007). 
 163. Le, supra note 36, at 407. 
 164. Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 851 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2009). 
 165. Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 86 N.Y.2d 165, 178 (1995).  Such a 
presence is required because the Quill court preserved the bright-line physical presence standard for 
substantial nexus found in Bella Hess.  Quill, 504 U.S. at 317–18. 
 166. Le, supra note 36, at 407. 
 167. Orvis, 86 N.Y.2d at 178.  The Orvis standard is controlling in this case because it was 
filed in the NY Court. 
 168. Id. at 177–78. 
 169. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249–50 (1987).  
The question in this case is whether the affiliates’ presence can be imputed to the plaintiffs.  The NY 
Court said that it could be, as will be discussed further.  See Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 851; see dis-
cussion infra Part V.B.3. 
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to create a physical presence in the state.170  A vendor’s in-state activities 
must also be “‘significantly associated with the taxpayer’s ability to es-
tablish and maintain a market in th[e] state for the sales.’”171 
2.  The Facial Challenge 
Amazon and Overstock first brought a facial challenge claiming the 
Statute was unconstitutionally vague.172,173  The NY Court noted “a party 
mounting a facial constitutional challenge bears the substantial burden of 
demonstrating that ‘in any degree and in every conceivable application’ 
the law suffers wholesale constitutional impairment.”174  The plaintiffs 
argued that the Statute “imposes tax collection obligations based on ac-
tivities that are insufficient to create a substantial nexus under the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.”175  In addition, it was argued that the Statute 
would apply to “simple advertising by in-state advertisers.”176  The NY 
Court disagreed with both arguments, stating flatly, “Amazon is 
wrong.”177 
The NY Court defended its position by noting that the Statute re-
quires that a vendor have connections with New York residents sufficient 
to create a substantial nexus with the state.178  To have a substantial nex-
us, a vendor must have a contract with a New York resident, the resident 
must refer potential customers to the vendor, the vendor must pay a 
commission or other consideration, and the arrangement must generate at 
least $10,000 in New York sales.179  The court emphasized that the ven-
dor can rebut the statutory presumption by showing that its New York 
actors did not engage in any solicitation in the state that would create 
nexus.180  Finally, the court held that the Statute would not cover mere 
advertising.181 
While much of what the NY Court said was correct, its conclusion 
regarding advertising was not.  For instance, the court correctly identified 
all of the Statute’s requirements and recognized that the vendor can rebut 
                                                 
 170. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6. 
 171. Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 250–51. 
 172. A “facial” challenge is “a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face—that is, that it 
always operates unconstitutionally.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (9th ed. 2009). 
 173. Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 15. 
 174. Amazon.com, LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842, 847–48 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2009) (quoting Matter of Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 99 N.Y.2d 443, 448 (2003)). 
 175. Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 15. 
 176. Id. at 16. 
 177. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 848. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
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the presumption.182  Additionally, it correctly stated that the Statute “con-
templates a substantial nexus with New York,”183 considering the Statute 
is clearly trying to find a way to work around the Quill substantial nexus 
standard.184  However, the sweeping statutory language that made the NY 
Court’s statements possible ultimately undermines its logic. 
The Statute is so broadly worded that it would cover mere advertis-
ing.  Thus, the NY Court’s argument that the Statute did not cover re-
mote retailers that generate only publicity is incorrect.185  The Statute’s 
requirements—a contract with a New York resident for the direct or indi-
rect referral of potential customers in exchange for a commission or oth-
er consideration that results in $10,000 in New York sales—would be 
met by traditional advertisements such as radio and television.186  The 
very purpose of advertising is to attain the referral of potential customers, 
whether directly or indirectly.187  Despite this, the NY Court stated that 
advertising would not fall under the Statute because “it imposes a tax-
collection obligation on sellers who contractually agree to compensate 
New York residents for business that they generate and not simply for 
publicity.”188 
When it comes to advertising, however, the distinction between ge-
nerating business and generating publicity is a distinction without a dif-
ference.  Advertising is defined as “the action of drawing the public’s 
attention to something to promote its sale,”189 while publicity can be de-
fined as “paid advertising.”190  Because promoting sales is essentially the 
same as generating business, advertising is a method of generating busi-
ness.  Further, because advertising is also a part of generating publicity, 
the NY Court erred in making a principled distinction between the 
                                                 
 182. Id. at 846.  See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (2008). 
 183. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (emphasis added). 
 184. See J.P. Finet & Dolores W. Gregory, New York’s Win in ‘Amazon.com’ Raising Fears of 
Impact on SSTP Project, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Jan. 15, 2009. 
 185. The Statute covers agreements in which a New York resident agrees, “for a commission 
or other consideration, directly or indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on an 
internet website or otherwise, to the seller.”  N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (2008) (emphasis 
added). 
 186. See Finet, supra note 184, at 3 (noting that radio and television advertisements are passive 
solicitation, which, if on the internet, could trigger the statutory presumption). 
 187. Entrepreneur.com, Term Definition: Advertising, 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/term/ 
82082.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2009). 
 188. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 848.  Although the NY Court did not mention it, the May TSB-
M also stated that mere advertising did not fall under the Statute. May TSB-M, supra note 107, at 2; 
see also discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 189. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 63 (9th ed. 2009). 
 190. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary: Publicity, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio 
nary/publicity (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). 
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two.191  The Statute imposes a tax obligation based on mere advertising, 
which is a direct violation of Quill.192 
Nevertheless, given the extremely high standard of proof required 
in facial challenges, this error likely did not change the result of the chal-
lenge.  It is difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy their burden of proving “that 
no set of circumstances exists under which the [Statute] would be va-
lid.”193  In this case, the Statute would validly apply in many situations 
(the May TSB-M lists several).194  As a result, the plaintiffs’ facial chal-
lenge was doomed before it started.  However, the fact that the Statute 
applies to advertising also impacts the plaintiffs’ as-applied Commerce 
Clause challenge. 
3.  The As-Applied Challenge 
The plaintiffs next brought an as-applied challenge, claiming it was 
unconstitutional to apply the Statute to the plaintiffs.195  The plaintiffs 
had three primary contentions for this challenge.196  First, the plaintiffs 
did not have a physical presence in New York because the affiliates’ ac-
tivities were merely advertising, not solicitation.197  Second, if the affili-
                                                 
 191. See Finet, supra note 184, at 3 (noting that affiliate programs are closer to advertising than 
in-state solicitation of sales).  However, the May TSB-M makes clear that DTF believes that mere 
advertising does not trigger the statutory presumption, and thus, DTF is unlikely to enforce it in that 
way.  May TSB-M, supra note 107, at 2; see also N.Y. TAX LAW § 12(c)(2) (2008) (stating that a 
“person” does not become a vendor—someone required to collect and remit tax—“solely by . . . (2) 
having its advertising disseminated or displayed on the Internet by an individual or entity subject to 
tax under [certain tax provisions]”).  In either case, DTF’s interpretation does not matter in a facial 
challenge, where only the statutory language is examined.  See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Roth, 99 
N.Y.2d 316, 322–23 (2003) (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 2375.6) (noting that 
TSB-M are merely “advisory in nature” and have no “legal force,” but are usually given deference as 
long as they are not irrational or unreasonable). 
 192. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992) (stating that basing nexus 
solely on advertising, mail, and telephone calls would unduly burden interstate commerce). 
 193. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (quoting Moran Towing Corp. v. Urbach, 99 N.Y.2d 443, 
448 (2003)). 
 194. May TSB-M, supra note 107, at 2–5.  For example, the May TSB-M describes a situation 
in which an Arizona fitness equipment seller has an agreement with several New York health clubs 
whereby the seller will pay a five percent commission to the clubs for any purchases of equipment 
by the club’s members.  Id. at 2–3.  The statutory presumption would apply here, and as long as the 
agreement generated over $10,000 in New York sales, the seller would be obligated to collect taxes 
on its New York sales.  Id. 
 195. Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 18.  An “as-applied” challenge is “a claim that a statute 
is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case or in its application to a particular party.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (9th ed. 2009). 
 196. See Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 848–49.  Each of the plaintiffs’ arguments, if accepted, 
would result in a lack of substantial nexus with New York, and the Statute would be overturned. 
 197. Id.  This argument harkens the fact that, under Quill, mere advertising does not create 
substantial nexus.  Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 21.  Arguing that the affiliates’ activities are 
mere advertising may, at first glance, seem contradictory to the plaintiffs’ facial challenge argument 
that the Statute covers mere advertising.  However, because basing a tax collection obligation on 
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ates were involved in solicitation, it had not been authorized by the plain-
tiffs and should not have been the basis for substantial nexus.198  Third, 
the affiliates’ activities were not “significantly associated with [the plain-
tiffs’] ability to establish and maintain a market for sales in New 
York.”199  As was the case with the facial challenge, the NY Court did 
not agree with any of the plaintiffs’ claims arising from their as-applied 
challenge.200 
The NY Court cited two main reasons for upholding the Statute’s 
constitutionality.  First, the NY Court noted that the plaintiffs had con-
tracted with New York residents, which it characterized as the plaintiffs’ 
“incentivized New York sales force.”201  The court reasoned that the 
plaintiffs benefitted from these contracts by obtaining more than $10,000 
in New York sales.202  “[The plaintiffs] should not be permitted to escape 
tax collection indirectly . . . when [they] would not be able to achieve tax 
avoidance directly through use of New York employees engaged in the 
very same activities.”203  Second, the court determined that it did not 
matter that the plaintiffs did not ask the affiliates to solicit sales or that 
the affiliates’ operating agreement prohibited them from engaging in cer-
tain conduct.204  It was enough that the New York affiliates could poten-
tially solicit sales in the state and were incentivized to do so (the plain-
tiffs would pay them commissions, even if unknowingly, for solicited 
sales).205  According to the court, the plaintiffs failed to even allege that 
the affiliates did not solicit sales from New York customers.206  Howev-
er, the NY Court’s opinion leaves room for disagreement. 
                                                                                                             
mere advertising would be a violation of Quill, the two arguments are not contradictory.  See Quill, 
504 U.S. at 313 n.6. 
 198. Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 24. 
 199. Id.  Amazon states that sales by New York affiliates amounted to less than 1.5% of its 
total sales in the state.  Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 27.  Overstock’s sales through its New 
York affiliates were insignificant enough that it decided to cut ties with all 3,400 of them rather than 
be obligated to collect the tax.  Internet Retailer, New York Judge Dismisses Amazon and Overstock 
Sales Tax Suits, Jan. 13, 2009, http://www.internetretailer.com/dailyNews.asp?id=29052 (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2009). 
 200. Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 849 (“None of these allegations, however, sufficiently state a 
claim for violation of the Commerce Clause.”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id.  The court stated the following: 
Amazon chooses to benefit from New York [affiliates] that are free to target New York-
ers and encourage Amazon sales, all while earning money for Amazon in return for 
which Amazon pays them commissions.  Amazon does not discourage its [affiliates] 
from reaching out to customers or contributors and pressing Amazon sales. 
Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
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The NY Court’s first argument—that the plaintiffs should not be 
able to avoid taxation when having employees engaged in the same ac-
tivities would trigger an obligation—fails to address two major issues.  
Characterizing the affiliates as actively soliciting sales too easily dis-
misses the argument that the affiliates’ activities are more akin to tradi-
tional advertising than solicitation.207  In addition, nowhere does the 
court address the U.S. Supreme Court’s requirement, as set forth in Tyler 
Pipe,208 that the activities be “significantly associated with [the plain-
tiffs’] ability to establish and maintain a market . . . for the sales” in New 
York.209  Each of these omissions deserves greater attention. 
The affiliates’ activities are more analogous to traditional print, tel-
evision, or radio advertising than to physical solicitation such as distri-
buting flyers or coupons;210 the only major difference is the compensa-
tion scheme.211  Like traditional advertising, affiliates passively distribute 
an advertisement that requires some sort of action by the customer.  The 
affiliates’ advertisements are simply disseminated over the internet in-
stead of in print or over the airwaves.212  Unlike traditional advertising, 
technology allows the merchant to track whether the affiliates’ adver-
tisements are directly contributing to sales and to compensate the affiliate 
only when it is effectively doing so.213 
                                                 
 207. See Finet, supra note 184, at 3. 
 208. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987) (quot-
ing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 105 Wash. 2d 318, 323 (1986)). 
 209. See Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d. 842. 
 210. See Finet, supra note 184, at 3. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. 
 213. Id. (noting that affiliate marketing created a shift from paying for an advertisement and 
hoping that it works to paying for an advertisement only when it works).  In its brief, New York 
argued that the Statute applies only to “out-of-state sellers who employ a business model that encou-
rages the active solicitation of sales by its representatives located in New York.”  Defendant’s 
Memo, supra note 20, at 25.  The NY Court may have adopted this argument without expressly 
stating it.  See Amazon, 877 N.Y.S.2d at 849.  However, neither the state nor the court elaborated as 
to why a pay-for-performance compensation scheme meets this criterion while a pay-per-click com-
pensation scheme (or any other similar scheme) does not.  Because both schemes require the cus-
tomer to perform some action before the affiliate is compensated (either a click or a purchase), they 
seem equally likely to encourage active solicitation.  In addition, the plain language of the Statute 
states that solicitation is presumed when the resident is compensated by “a commission or other 
compensation,” which leaves no room for a distinction between commissions and other compensato-
ry schemes.  N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi) (2008) (emphasis added).  Thus, there is no compelling 
reason for holding that compensating affiliates through a pay-for-performance compensation scheme 
should result in a finding of substantial nexus when compensating through a pay-per-click scheme 
does not.  Even if the merchant is allowed to rebut the presumption of substantial nexus, no such 
obligation should be placed on the merchant in the first place.  Doing so contravenes the Quill 
court’s reason for keeping the bright-line physical presence standard—namely, to “encourage[] 
settled expectations and, in doing so, foster[] investment by businesses and individuals.”  Quill Corp 
v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992). 
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While it may seem that compensating only effective advertisers 
would create an incentive for the affiliates to physically solicit sales, this 
is not the case due to the nature of internet marketing.  Unlike traditional 
advertising, affiliates and other internet advertisers try to increase traffic 
to their own website, rather than direct traffic straight to the website of 
the company running the affiliate program.214  In fact, most affiliates en-
gage in affiliate marketing for many different companies and, thus, have 
no incentive to solicit sales for any one company.215  Because the internet 
allows the affiliates to reach a broader market, it is easier for them to use 
online sources to increase traffic to their website than to physically soli-
cit sales in the geographic area where they reside.  Furthermore, unlike 
traditional advertising, which is specific to a particular geographic re-
gion, internet marketing can be done from any location without consum-
ers ever knowing where the advertiser is located.216  For these reasons, 
there is little incentive for an affiliate to solicit sales locally. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that other, similar types of pas-
sive advertising activity do not create substantial nexus.217  In Quill, the 
Court stated that creating a tax obligation based on activities such as ad-
vertising, mail, and telephone calls would unduly burden interstate com-
merce.218  Because of the similarities noted between these activities and 
the affiliates’ activities, it was inappropriate for the NY Court to base a 
finding of substantial nexus on the affiliates’ activities. 
The affiliates’ activities are not “significantly associated with the 
taxpayer’s ability to establish and maintain a market in th[e] state for the 
sales”219 because the affiliates are not locally based and provide no in-
formation about the local market.220  While it is not explicitly stated an-
ywhere in the decision, it appears that the NY Court attempted to equate 
the activities of the plaintiffs’ affiliates to those of the independent con-
tractors that created a taxable nexus in Scripto and Tyler Pipe.221  How-
ever, both of those cases can be readily distinguished from the case at 
hand. 
                                                 
 214. Joshua K. Lawrence & Timothy P. Noonan, Merchants and Affiliates Struggle to Navigate 
New York’s ‘Amazon Law,’ 52 State Tax Notes 73, 73–74 (Apr. 6, 2009). 
 215. See id. 
 216. Michele Borens & Mark Yopp, Overextending Attributional Nexus: States’ Latest At-
tempts to Tax Internet Sales, 51 State Tax Notes 697, 698 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 217. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6. 
 218. See id. 
 219. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987) (quot-
ing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 105 Wash. 2d 318, 323 (1986)). 
 220. Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 27. 
 221. This argument could have been gleaned from New York’s memo, which attempted to do 
the same thing.  See Defendant’s Memo, supra note 20, at 25. 
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In Scripto and Tyler Pipe, the in-state independent contractors were 
the merchants’ primary means for obtaining sales and creating lasting 
relationships with customers in the area.222  In contrast, the affiliates’ 
activities are not locally based, provide no information about the local 
market, and do not build relationships with local customers.223  Moreo-
ver, the affiliates play no role in the sale, whereas the contractors in 
Scripto and Tyler Pipe collected the sale information and forwarded it to 
the out-of-state retailer.224  The geographically untethered nature of the 
internet indicates that the in-state affiliates’ activities are not significant-
ly associated with the plaintiffs’ ability to establish or maintain a market 
for sales in that particular state. 
Additional evidence of the insignificance of the affiliates’ activities 
to the plaintiffs’ ability to maintain a market in New York is readily 
available.  For example, Amazon had New York sales before it started its 
affiliate marketing program.225  Furthermore, sales to New York custom-
ers originating from New York-based affiliates comprise less than 1.5% 
of Amazon’s sales in the state.226 
Instead of worrying about compliance with the Statute, Overstock 
decided to cut ties with all of its approximately 3,400 New York affili-
ates on May 15, 2008, guaranteeing that it would not trigger the statutory 
presumption of solicitation.227  Because the affiliates’ activities are akin 
to traditional advertising and do not significantly contribute to the plain-
tiffs’ ability to establish or maintain a market for sales in New York, they 
should not be a basis for a finding of substantial nexus. 
                                                 
 222. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 209–10 (1960); Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 249–50. 
 223. Customers who click on an advertisement on an affiliates’ website generally do not know 
where the affiliate is physically located.  The customer using the affiliate’s website is just as likely to 
be from New Delhi as New York; the very nature of the internet makes it equally easy for a person 
from either place to access the website.  Thus, unlike an in-state salesperson that must actually be in-
state to be effective, an affiliate could generate the same amount of sales no matter where it is physi-
cally located. 
 224. Amazon Operating Agreement §§ 3, 7, July 23, 2009, https://affiliate-
program.amazon.com/ (Follow “Operating Agreement” hyperlink on the right side of the page) (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Amazon Agreement]; see Scripto, 362 U.S. at 209–10; see also 
Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 249–50.  The plaintiffs both handle all aspects of the sale on their own; the 
affiliates’ only involvement is redirecting the customer from their website to the plaintiffs’ website.  
See, e.g., Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 27. 
 225. Amazon Memo, supra note 20, at 27. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Overstock stated that its reason for doing so was that “New York’s new tax law required 
us to choose between New York customers and New York ad businesses.  In the end, we chose our 
customers.”  Press Release, Overstock.com, Inc., Overstock.com Says ‘Yes’ to New York Consum-
ers, ‘No’ to New York’s New Internet Sales Tax (May 15, 2008) (available at 
http://investors.overstock.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=131091&p=irol-ewsArticle&ID=1146398&high 
light=).  Presumably, Overstock would have been unable to cut these ties if the New York affiliates 
were “significantly associated” with Overstock’s ability to maintain a market for sales in New York. 
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The NY Court’s second major argument—that it did not matter that 
the affiliates were soliciting sales without the plaintiffs’ consent—also 
falls short.  The unauthorized activities of independent contractors are an 
insufficient basis for a finding of substantial nexus because any affiliate 
that engaged in solicitation activities in New York would be in violation 
of its agreement with Amazon or Overstock.228  Also, principals are gen-
erally not liable for the acts of independent contractors because they do 
not control the method the contractor uses to perform its work.229  Con-
sequently, the affiliates’ activities should not be imputed to the plaintiffs 
to support the creation of tax collection obligations and potential tax lia-
bility.230  This is especially true when the affiliates’ actions are unautho-
rized and in violation of their agreement with the plaintiffs.231  Neither 
the State nor the NY Court produced any precedent for holding the mer-
chant liable for the unauthorized acts of independent contractors.  Until 
such precedent is available, the affiliates’ unauthorized actions should 
not create substantial nexus for the plaintiffs. 
In the end, the NY Court was correct in holding that the Statute 
does not violate the Due Process Clause, but it should have found the 
Statute’s application to Amazon and Overstock an unconstitutional ex-
tension of current Commerce Clause doctrine.  Because the plaintiffs 
purposefully directed their activities toward New York by contracting 
with affiliates located in the state, the Statute is consistent with the Due 
Process Clause.  This, however, is not the case with the dormant Com-
merce Clause.  The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that mere advertising 
does not create substantial nexus and DTF has agreed in its interpreta-
tions of the Statute.  The NY Court fails in its attempt to equate the activ-
ities of the plaintiffs’ affiliates with those of the independent salesper-
sons that created a substantial nexus in Scripto and Tyler Pipe.  Affili-
ates, by agreement, do nothing more than post a passive advertisement 
                                                 
 228. Both plaintiffs’ agreements with their affiliates limit the activities that affiliates may en-
gage in on behalf of the particular plaintiff.  The Amazon Operating Agreement prohibits affiliates 
from “tak[ing] any action that could reasonably cause any customer confusion as to our relationship 
with you, or as to the site on which any functions or transactions . . . are occurring,” and 
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on their website.  Any solicitation activity the affiliates may engage in 
has not been authorized by the plaintiffs and thus, does not form a suffi-
cient basis to impose a tax collection obligation.  For these reasons, the 
affiliates’ activities do not create the substantial nexus required by the 
Commerce Clause and the Statute should be found unconstitutional. 
VI.  THE EFFECTS OF TAXING E-COMMERCE 
In addition to the unconstitutional burdens imposed on the plain-
tiffs, the Statute has had one very noteworthy side effect and is likely to 
result in several more. 
The most noteworthy side effect of the Statute is the impact it has 
had on the local businesses it was meant to protect—namely, the New 
York affiliates themselves.  Many of the affiliates are small, independent 
businesses.232  In order to avoid the tax collection obligation, many of the 
companies that maintain affiliate programs have simply cut all ties with 
their New York affiliates.233  One website, purporting to maintain a com-
plete record of companies taking this measure, lists sixty such compa-
nies.234  The list includes some leading companies such as Overstock, 
CafePress, and Fingerhut.235  Another website, NY Affiliate Voice, esti-
mates that New York affiliates have lost between 20% and 90% of their 
income since the Statute took effect.236  Consequently, it is unlikely that 
New York will collect the $47 million in annual revenue it had antic-
ipated collecting as a result of the Statute.237 
New York might meet its revenue collection goal, however, if every 
other state enacted a similar statute.  Many other states are carefully 
watching the developments in New York and will likely impose their 
own tax obligations on e-tailers.238  Some already have: Rhode Island and 
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North Carolina have both passed “Amazon provisions” modeled on the 
Statute.239  And more states are likely to follow as they see the results in 
Rhode Island and New York.240  In a report examining the impact of the 
New York and Rhode Island laws, the Center for Budget and Policy 
Priorities recommended that other states seriously consider adopting sim-
ilar measures.241  Should every state adopt the same type of measure, e-
tailers would face a difficult choice between entirely eliminating their 
affiliate programs or collecting use tax in all fifty states.242  However, 
because “[t]he ubiquity of affiliate programs and the amount of money 
that retailers spend on them suggest that they are highly valuable to re-
tailers,”243 it is quite likely that e-tailers would refuse to drop the pro-
grams.244  If this were the case, e-tailers would have to collect use tax on 
internet sales in all fifty states.245  This would allow all of the states to 
meet their revenue generation forecasts for the new laws. 
If many states require collection and remittance of sales tax, com-
panies will be subject to an additional reporting burden.  This additional 
reporting burden, in turn, could have a chilling effect on the growth of e-
commerce.246  Furthermore, what is there to stop other states from impos-
ing more onerous tax burdens on smaller e-tailers with even more te-
nuous connections to the states?  Where do we draw the line? 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Of course, the ultimate question in this Amazon Tax saga is, “Who 
cares?  How does this affect me personally?”  Residents of New York 
who shop with Amazon or other major e-tailers have already been af-
fected; they now pay a tax charge on all of their purchases.  If the Statute 
is upheld, residents of every other state will most likely have a similar 
experience.247  On a more positive note, states will be better able to pro-
vide the services we all depend on as the reduction of their revenues is 
slowed or even stopped.  Nonetheless, your days of tax-free shopping on 
the internet are likely numbered. 
Ultimately, the Amazon Tax represents just one more way that 
states have attempted to circumvent the Quill substantial nexus standard.  
Until a determination of what constitutes a substantial nexus is resolved 
and Congress develops a policy on how to tax internet sales, e-tailers will 
continue to operate in a very uncertain tax landscape.  Whether Congress 
will enact a federal statute to clear up the situation or whether states will 
continue to enact piecemeal attempts to circumvent Quill remains to be 
seen.  The court battle over the Statute has the potential to play a key role 
in this determination.  But, as long as internet sales continue to grow and 
states continue to feel they are losing out on revenue, the Amazon Tax is 
only the first of many attempts to tax internet sales. 
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